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Abstract   
 
To many people ethics for spies is the ultimate oxymoron.  Wiser eyes see that the Revolution in 
Intelligence Affairs (RIA) highlights dilemmas common to the profession of arms in general.  
Without some self-restraint (a.k.a. discipline) the most powerful militaries on earth have been 
able to destroy civilization for about 50 years.  Recent developments in information technologies 
may destroy liberty, because they empower police-states in particular to detect and repress 
dissent.  So restraint of power in electronic intelligence is also prudent, but rare. To guard against 
police-states armed with WMDs, and the amorphous threats of non-state terrorists, military and 
internal security services naturally wish to know everything possible about everyone who might 
become a spy or a terrorist.  That would be every person on earth.  Thus overzealous security 
services risk destroying the very freedoms they were empowered to protect, even in democracies. 
 
This dilemma has challenged traditions like just war theory that strive to restrain some decisions 
to start wars and some conduct during wars.  What happens to discrimination and proportionality 
when it becomes more efficient (and far more powerful) to collect data on everyone continuously 
rather than waiting for “probable cause” to suspect criminal behavior by particular individuals?  
What happens to liberty?  How should commanders react if political leaders prove indifferent to 
restraints like rule of law in their zest to detect every ‘criminal’ which so often includes rival 
politicians or critics of the state?  How should officers at any level act when oaths to “preserve, 
protect and defend the Constitution” conflict with non-disclosure agreements to agencies?  
 
Edward Snowden became well known when he revealed how the RIA was transforming signals 
intelligence.  Critics call him a traitor for violating non-disclosure contracts, while supporters 
call him a patriot for defending the U.S. Constitution from damage by overzealous bureaucracies 
with no effective oversight.  Whatever one thinks about Mr. Snowden, he was preceded by a 
long line of similar, if less successful “whistleblowers.”  Such people develop slowly over time, 
so there must be other whistleblowers (and/or traitors) incubating.  So now there is an extensive 
“Insider Threat” program that erodes the few freedoms left to those who volunteer to work hard 
and sometimes risk their lives for American intelligence services and national security.  
 
This is more significant at the level of strategic versus tactical intelligence, where the logic of 
operational security is obvious to all.  Keeping secrets saves friendly lives in operations.  But we 
should not forget that Snowden was preceded by, and will be followed by, others who take their 
oaths to the U.S. Constitution very seriously.  These themes will be expanded with reference to 
the historic development of professional ethics in law and medicine.1 Intelligence professionals 
are trying to develop an ethos up to the challenges of their roles in world affairs.   The fate of 
nations and of core American values like freedom, democracy and rule of law hangs on whether 
they succeed in time, while guarding the perimeter against dangers known to all.      
                                                          
1 Author essay on this in the American Intelligence Journal, Vol. 28 No. 1, 2010, pgs. 82-92, published by the NMIA 
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Introduction 
 
The strategic challenge of our time is between civilization and barbarism, not any particular 
conflict between nations, alliances or entities.  This critical truth is often obscured by focus on 
tactical details.  It calls us to remember why laws of war were first conceived, deliberated, and 
ultimately ratified by all the nations on earth that we call “civilized.”  
 
Barbarians will do anything to win.  “Restraint” is a sign, a footprint, the mark of civilization.  
Law intends to restrain barbarism.  So rule of law has many enemies.  We have been able to 
destroy “civilization as we know it” for at least 50 years.  So our strategic forces, and others on 
earth, better stay restrained lest we be doomed.  For over 100 years humans have been able to lay 
waste entire populations, and we have killed millions with chemical and other weapons of mass 
destruction, many now banned.  So some restraints on the barbarism of total war were called for 
by the suffering of the earth, not least troops maimed in the two World Wars of the 20th century. 
 
The strategic challenge of our time is between civilization and barbarism, and ways of war are a 
key distinction between barbarians and those who would call themselves civilized.  Challenges 
like torture or prudent use of force are not new.  They have actually been with us for millennia, 
since any of us can become a barbarian in the blink of an eye (or at least behave like one) if our 
families are in peril. That is not unique; indeed it is very human. Applying restraint to such harsh 
situations is a challenge for civilization.  This does not mean surrender.  It means discipline and 
resilience.  Every advanced nation on earth concluded that human survival is in peril if we do not 
grow up enough to avoid killing ourselves, or destroying core values with our deadliest weapons. 
  
At the same time we worry about spreading WMDs, those who spend full-time protecting the 
free world must also watch the proliferation of failed and failing states that provide such fertile 
ground for terrorists and terrorism.  A “developing global crisis” of expanding populations and 
declining natural resources is creating more unemployed, very poorly educated teenaged males 
than could be killed with every bomb on earth.  Such hopeless teens are fodder for demagogues. 
 
“Intelligence ethics” struggles with the distinction between civilization and barbarism when it 
dissects torture, kidnapping and assassination (noting euphemisms like “enhanced interrogation,” 
“extraordinary renditions” and “targeted killing”).  We struggle with this distinction when we 
discuss intelligence collection on domestic populations, so much easier today with modern 
technology.  At what point is turning a weapon of war against your own population immoral?  
Some people forget that national security intelligence is a weapon of war, and are quite care-free 
when they urge us to turn such powers against our own people, searching for bad guys among us. 
 
It would be nice, therefore, if “intelligence ethics” were a mature field.  But in truth it is barely a 
baby when compared to fields like medicine and law.  They took a century each to develop their 
own professional codes of ethics, under less pressure.  There are a few books of variable quality 
on intelligence ethics today i, one small international society with a journal of about 6 years 
duration (IIEA) ii, a flurry of executive orders and decision directives from Presidents or DNIs, 
and libraries of commentary from lawyers (mostly) on current cases.  But systematic efforts to 
cultivate a real ethos for intelligence professionals are truly at the baby stage today. 
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On the plus side, page 3 of the “National Intelligence Strategy of the USA” is entirely devoted to 
“Principles of Professional Ethics for the Intelligence Community” and the seven items there are 
universal virtues. iii  This is a big improvement over past documents.  None of them explains how 
we came to rationalize torture as standard practice, surveillance of all US citizens as routine, or 
how we became known worldwide as the most warmongering country on earth and indifferent to 
international laws of war that we expect others to obey.  But it is a big step up from predecessors. 
 
The works cited at the end list only English language entries, so who knows how much “ethics” 
activity may be bubbling up in other intelligence services?  Not me, even though I get around.  
But I would bet hard money there is not much outside the Anglo world because of a systematic 
fear of “ethics” among intelligence bureaucracies first mentioned in print by Jan Goldman from 
our National Intelligence University in his 2007 chapter on “Ethics Phobia.” iv  To the best I can 
estimate, foreign intelligence services like Arab mukhabarat, Israel’s MOSSAD, and quite a few 
Asian entities wonder if America has gone completely bonkers discussing intelligence affairs so 
openly as the USA today.  They know why spy groups fear “ethics” – spies are in the business of 
breaking other people’s laws every day.  Sometimes bones.  And protecting sources and methods 
is a mantra to all intelligence professionals.  Besides, there is zero money in ethics for spies, but 
there are many incentives for providing good intelligence, especially if that is available fast. 
 
So we will close this introduction with a focus on that need for speed, and the overwhelming 
priority that national security issues often bring to big problems.  Would you rather be morally 
pure and dead, or alive and soiled by horrible things you did to survive attack by barbarians?  It 
does not take a Ph.D. in philosophy to see some logic in this question.  Survivors of the Shoah 
(Jewish Holocaust in WWII) ask this often.  And if you have been hired, trained and equipped 
specifically to protect a population against such maniacs, why should ethics be a big concern 
compared with winning the battle against forces of evil before you?  The answer to that question 
is to avoid becoming the evil you oppose.  Philosophers have spoken to that problem also. v 
 
 
Why Intelligence Ethics is a Key to MUCH Bigger Issues 
 
Human survival is a goal that transcends victory for one country or another.  It is at risk to the 
warring states we see today, so many oblivious to international law, and many with WMDs in 
their arsenals.  Intelligence ethics tries to explain why some things are even more important than 
winning as fast as one can.  It also attempts to show by examples how evil methods create evil 
outcomes far more often than not, no matter how sincere or pious the actors.  There are endless 
examples of “unanticipated consequences” from bending or breaking core rules for expediency. 
 
Consider the second US war in Iraq (2003-2011).  Speaking truth to power is a core principle for 
intelligence analysts.  Brutally summarizing a complex genesis, this second invasion of Iraq by 
US and allied forces was sold to the US public, Congress and allies on grounds that Saddam 
Hussein was concealing WMDs of great significance, and was a secret ally of Osama bin Laden.  
All false.  The administration tried to sell this idea to the United Nations also, in a speech by 
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Secretary of State, Gen. Colin Powell at the UN on Feb. 5, 2003.  He said there:  “These are not 
assertions.  What we’re giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence.” But the 
UN did not agree that the evidence was solid, because it was not.  After invasion on March 20, 
and a very intensive search for ground evidence to corroborate these fears, both turned out to be 
false. But a nation had been destroyed that may never be restored, tens of thousands of American 
troops were killed and wounded (> 500,000 Iraqis) and the financial cost to the USA will almost 
certainly exceed $2 trillion when all the health care bills and death benefits are paid. vi 
 
Those are very large adverse consequences to very many people from a lack of ETHICS among 
intelligence professionals, not merely a lack of good technique.  There were certainly people 
inside the US IC vii who tried to point out that some of the allegations were flat-out false.  Some 
had even been fabricated, like a letter alleging that Iraq had purchased uranium yellowcake from 
Niger.  The UN detected this forgery, and other flaws, but the US administration did not and even 
destroyed the career of a CIA nuclear proliferation officer in the National Clandestine Service 
because her husband and former Ambassador to Niger, Joe Wilson, dared to write an op-ed in the 
New York Times months later pointing out the letter’s dubious origins and questionable accuracy. 
 
Some call this a failure of intelligence (usually policy people); others call it a failure of policy 
which was driving intelligence assessments.  Sir Richard Dearlove (the head of Britain’s MI6) 
reported to his Prime Minister on July 23, 2002 that “the intelligence was being fixed around the 
policy.” viii  That is an extremely concise definition of “politicization” of intelligence, a cardinal 
sin among ethical analysts, but regrettably common.  CIA analysts, at least, are always supposed 
to tell truth to power “without fear or favor.”  But then they may risk their careers.  The power of 
politicians, and mere superiors, to end analytic careers if they do not confirm the fond beliefs of 
superiors is legendary. ix  Far more thorough reviews of the Iraq case can be found in “A Pretext 
for War” by James Bamford (2005) and “The Greatest Story ever Sold” by Frank Rich (2006). x 
 
There are grave costs of other kinds from this type of misbehavior, to both the American public 
and to honest practitioners within an intelligence system that is essential for the protection of the 
public that authorizes, funds, trains and empowers intelligence professionals.  Space is too short 
here to itemize those, but they include high rates of divorce, alcoholism and even suicide among 
those who discover that their oaths to the US Constitution are superseded, in practice, by 
nondisclosure agreements to specific agencies.  Let us turn to signals intelligence for a moment. 
 
Freedom, and some degree of privacy, are other goods that could be destroyed quite thoroughly 
by the RIA (Revolution in Intelligence Affairs) as it rolls on. This is most obvious in surveillance 
of electronic communications today.  In war this is not a big problem since you certainly want to 
know everything you can about enemy communications, and there are many historic cases 
showing how powerful that can be (like “Enigma” in WW II Europe, and breaking the military 
codes of Japan). xi  Domestically there are many reasons why it would be useful if police could 
track everyone, everywhere, for example, in addition to recording all their cell phone and 
computer communications.  There is no doubt that very crazy people leave warning indicators 
prior to their explosions, so you can be certain that someone is getting their Ph.D. now on how to 
detect them.  It is a small step from “Joe might be angry someday in the future” to “why not pick 
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up Joe now and find out what he’s doing today?”  New York City tried “stop and frisk” for scary 
minorities, and harvested deep hatred, so even the NYPD rejected this as a policy for everyone.  
One of the best references on how “Big Brother” might become a problem is the classic 1984 by 
George Orwell.xii  It is not a nice police-state, yet countries like Russia, North Korea and China 
work hard today to achieve such capability.  But does this mean the fortress of freedom should? 
 
 
Why Intelligence Ethics is Intrinsically Rooted in the Ethics of War and Peace 
 
Spies have been with us at least as long as recorded history.  They are mentioned in the Jewish 
Bible (Old Testament, long predating the New) among other ancient sources.  And the value of 
tactical, military intelligence proved itself so thoroughly that the incomparable Chinese General 
Sun Tzu devoted an entire chapter of his Art of War to “The Employment of Spies.” xiii  As with 
so many technologies, the crucible of war forged development of ever more elaborate systems of 
decision support for Generals and Emperors.   
 
Thus since ancient times national security intelligence has been mainly an instrument of war, 
although there are certainly times when good intelligence has also prevented wars from starting.  
But instruments, like a club, sword, gun or nuclear weapon, have no morality per se.  They are 
merely tools used for good or evil by people who theoretically do have consciences and some 
kind of moral framework within which they make decisions.  The phenomenon of psychopathy 
suggests that some few people may completely fail to develop “conscience” or empathy for 
others. xiv  When those rare individuals take over governments, police-states can arise that 
murder millions in their insatiable quest for ever more power. xv Military forces have had to 
contend with both psychopaths and enemy armies organized by psychopaths for millennia.  
 
Of course, almost any human being can behave like a psychopath in the most severe situations.  
And real spies, to the extent I have come to know them, are always people with some sense of 
right and wrong, and some loyalty to this tribe or that. 
 
So those with consciences pondered moral dilemmas before the word “ethics” was even invented 
by the Greeks and Hebrews. So did some Generals and Emperors, like Ashoka the Great of India 
(who renounced war and adopted Buddhism after slaughtering hundreds of thousands of people 
consolidating his empire) xvi and Constantine of the Eastern Roman Empire, who enabled St. 
Augustine of Hippo to formulate the beginnings of Just War Theory (JWT). xvii 
 
Both Generals with consciences and Emperors with their more diverse sources of political 
intelligence felt the daily weight of responsibility for the survival of some group of people 
surrounded by an often hostile world.  As the scale of both weapons and conflicts increased, the 
costs of waging wars with no rules at all became increasingly clear. 
 
It bears recollection that humankind reached 1 billion alive at the same time just 200 years ago.  
We are almost 7.5 billion people now, headed toward 12 according to UN demographers. xviii  
The scale of weapons available to the most powerful potential adversaries today is quite enough 
to end “civilization as we know it” and perhaps humankind itself if the worst kinds of biological 
weapons theoretically possible have been created. 
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The pressure on Earth is intense, so we do not have forever to figure out why some ethics even 
for spies is essential. Spies (and intelligence professionals xix) who break the laws of other 
nations routinely are supposed to provide early warning of serious dangers to their employers.  
Note to spies everywhere:  The planet is in big trouble, and failed states are a danger to everyone 
in a great many ways that cannot be contained by walls no matter how strong.  Therefore security 
“solutions” that leave billions dispossessed, ignorant, and with no hope for a viable economic 
future are not good solutions.  They are memories of ancient times when genocides could be 
accomplished and survived.  WMDs and the internet have changed all that. 
 
The nature of their work presents spies with unusual moral dilemmas.  Like soldiers in the field, 
issues of life and death are all around them.  Pressure is intense.  Imagine the mind of an agent 
trying to penetrate a terrorist organization, or the high command of police-states like North 
Korea.  But unlike soldiers, spies deliberately wear false colors and work mainly in isolation or 
very small groups when they are in the field.  They enter communities specifically to betray them 
in some way, or to find someone within who will.   
 
Most cogently, spies using the old paradigm where they pretend to be of one tribe or group while 
they are really working for another, violate daily the most ancient of all ethics: “Our tribes are 
the good (human) people, to be defended against all others.”  Traitors are universally despised.  
This is why many “intelligence professionals” prefer to be distinguished from “spies” even 
though they are in nearly identical businesses. 
 
Then there is the toolkit!  Assassination, bribery, blackmail, extortion, torture, theft and threats 
of all those things are the dark part of the toolkit or “tradecraft” of spies on the operational side.  
Neither as attractive nor as visible as bullets, bombs and precision delivery systems, some are 
very effective in their own ways with the notable exception of torture.  That always has adverse 
unintended consequences and seldom produces truly useful, actionable intelligence in time 
despite the “ticking time bomb” scenarios so often advanced to justify extreme measures.   
 
Finally, almost all of the current legal rationales for intelligence systems rely on the same 
foundation as ordinary military forces: Protection of the people and the state from all enemies, 
foreign and domestic.  Therefore intelligence ethics must be and is intrinsically rooted in military 
ethics.  Intelligence historically has been an instrument of war and addresses the same life-and-
death issues that war confronts the ordinary soldier and Generals with. 
 
But ethics for spies is in an infantile stage compared to other professional ethics, including 
military ethics while global problems grow.  And spies are, well, different from ordinary troops.  
So somehow we must transcend limitations of the past before our time for ‘growing up’ runs out.   
 
 
Conclusions 
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The most significant negative military consequence of lack of ethics among intelligence services 
is destruction of liaison relationships with allies.  Liaisons became ever more important to us as 
the simple, bi-polar world with one obvious enemy alliance was replaced by a “hydra-headed” 
complex of ever shifting threats with variable military dimensions.  Examples include terrorism 
and transnational organized crime of course, but strategic thinkers are increasingly recognizing 
that global warming, desertification, rising economic inequalities and inequities, proliferation of 
failed and failing states as well as WMDs, and a long list of other messy problems like cyber 
issues are resulting in actual people attacking US forces abroad and sometimes even at home. 
  
There are over 200 countries and about 6,000 languages and distinct dialects on earth.  Some are 
splintering as I write.  Even the Goliaths of Intelligence cannot cover all those comprehensively.  
All the bombs on earth are not enough to target all the millions of dispossessed teenaged males 
coming of age today.  So liaison relationships with other intelligence entities with their distinct 
language and HUMINT capabilities are ever more important today.  “Coalition operations” are 
also more important in the strictly military world that must guard against growing asymmetric 
threats while not forgetting dangers like general thermonuclear war that never went away. 
 
The second most obvious danger of low ethics among our intelligence professionals is quality of 
workforce.  Best and brightest people seldom volunteer to work for psychopaths.  So if your intel 
system is grossly immoral, you eventually end up with 2nd and 3rd rate commanders who hire 4th 
and 5th rate employees.  That is not a good result for any group whose main product is supposed 
to be superior “intelligence” to support decisions by military and political leaders. I consult often 
with recovering police-states like Romania who have endured many tragic consequences of that. 
 
Retired Air Force Lt. General David Deptula, then Dean of the Air Force Association’s Mitchell 
Institute for Aerospace Studies told a conference co-sponsored by RAND in Nov. 2014 that: 
“The battlespace for the 21st century is the human mind, not some particular chunk of territory or 
seas” and that “… concepts of the last century will simply be eclipsed in the information age.” xx  
At the same time that propaganda becomes ever more sophisticated, psychological operations 
can be contemplated by ever smaller entities.  Laptops can produce TV shows, and teens in tents 
can do the editing, then distribute worldwide.  Almost everyone in strategic intelligence also 
recognizes that the complex, interdisciplinary and dynamic challenges of our future put an ever 
greater premium on critical thinking skills and ability to work across national and disciplinary 
boundaries.  This is similar in some ways to the challenges of joint operations which America 
overcame a generation ago (well, mostly overcame).  And for all the wild successes of signals 
intelligence recently, it turns out that most people still don’t have a clue what is actually going on 
unless you have a very well-placed agent near the centers of adversary decision making. 
 
Perhaps the wisest General of all time, the incomparable Sun Tzu of ancient China wrote: xxi 
 
 “Generally, in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this.  
To capture the enemy’s army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a battalion, a 
company or a five-man squad is better than to destroy them.   For to win one hundred 
victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without 
fighting is the acme of skill.” 3:1-3. 
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 “If not in the interests of the state, do not act.  If you cannot succeed, do not use 
troops.  If you are not in danger, do not fight.  A sovereign cannot raise an army because 
he is enraged, nor can a general fight because he is resentful.  For while an angered man 
may again be happy, and a resentful man again be pleased, a state that has perished 
cannot be restored, nor can the dead be brought back to life.  Therefore the enlightened 
ruler is prudent and the good general is warned against rash action.  Thus the state is 
kept secure and the army preserved.”  12:17-19.   
 
Sun Tzu’s words have been republished for 2500 years, long after the emperors he worked for 
have been forgotten, because unlike most of his peers, Sun Tzu was wise as well as skilled.  
There is a very thin constituency for wisdom among active intelligence professionals.  The 
problem here is not fear, but the reluctance of many policy leaders to be led.  Many of the 
politicians think that they are in the wisdom business, and resent advice in favor of “objective 
facts” and options instead, so that they alone can judge what to do.  Therefore analysts are often 
taught to mind their place, as objective advisors only, not as policy makers per se. 
 
But like the best intelligence analysts, it is the sacred duty of Generals to tell the bosses what 
they need to know without fear or favor.  I encourage all uniformed military to do so whenever 
necessary, whether in the intelligence fields or any other.  This can be dangerous for careers, but 
it is our duty.  So I hope you will remember why when you reach the apex of your careers. 
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are now being raised to 12 billion due to advances in global health, with little decrease in birthrates in Africa. 
xix I will spare the reader a long history of discussion of which term to use when (spy or “intelligence professional”) 
by summarizing it.  There is a narrow definition of “spy” that includes only those people who betray their own 
countries or groups to provide secret information to others, and a broad definition of “spy” that includes anyone 
employed by national intelligence entities and the agents handlers run who are foreign nationals.  I use the broad 
definition here and abroad because the narrow one results in moral confusion.  The internal language of many 
agencies is rife with moral escapism and euphemisms whose prime purpose is pointing blame at anyone but actual 
perpetrators.  All of these professionals start out as perfectly lovely human babies and I’ve been one, but they are 
spies in the end, and almost every one of them chose that occupation.  Before you rush to judgment, remember 
that a good spy with the right information at the right time can change the outcome of battles, wars and history. 
xx General Deptula’s comments can be found in “Innovating for Airpower” by Autumn A. Arnette, pages 18-19 in 
the Air Force Magazine, January, 2015. 
xxi Sun Tzu, The Art of War, as translated by Samuel B. Griffith in the Oxford University Press edition of 1963.  These 
quotes come from Chapters 3 and 12. 
